Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 39

Issue 1

Article 14

1950

Creditors' Bills and Actions to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances-Prerequisites to Suit
Arloe W. Mayne
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mayne, Arloe W. (1950) "Creditors' Bills and Actions to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances--Prerequisites
to Suit," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 39: Iss. 1, Article 14.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol39/iss1/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

NOTES. AND COMMENTS

108

CREDITORS' BILLS AND ACTIONS TO SET ASIDE FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES - PREREQUISITES TO SUIT
Not the least of the lawyer s problems is to obtain satisfaction of a judgment
once it has been obtained. When the difficulty springs from the penury of the
judgment debtor it is, of course, insurmountable, for no legal machinery can wring
blood from a turnip. Very often, however, the difficulty is not so fundamental as
it is procedural. The usual procedure by which a judgment is satisfied at law is
by execution, levy, and sale of the debtor s assets. With the growth of commerce
and new forms of property a debtor often has valuable interests which this clumsv
and narrow process will not reach. To remedy this situation equity has lent the
aid of its more adaptable process, through various types of suits known as creditors
bills. The creditors bill may be used to reach any property of the debtor which
by reason of its nature only, and not by some positive rule of law or statute exempting it from liability for debt,' cannot be reached by execution at law. Thus,
at common law such intangible property as a patent cannot be reached by executionl it can be by a creditors bill. Nor can a debtor s contingent interests be
reached generally by execution; they can be reached by means of a creditors bill.3
In the absence of statute equitable interests cannot be sold under execution;4 but
in general may be subjected to the payment of the debt by a creditors bill.6 While
an individual's joint interest in notes and a mortgage is not subject to garmshment
or execution, it has been held that such interest may be reached by a creditors
bill.' At law the relation of creditors to debtor corporations is the ordinary relation of debtor and creditor, and in the absence of statute there is no relation between the creditor and stockholders of the corporation. But creditors bills may
be maintained against the stockholders of a private corporation for payment of
unpaid stock subscriptions. Property which the debtor has conveyed in fraud of
his creditors cannot be reached by execution because the title is no longer in the
debtor. Such a conveyance can be set aside by a creditors bill.' Another function of the creditors bill is to obtain a complete discovery of the debtor s assets
and a disclosure of the names of his debtors.'
Statutes in various states have greatly enlarged the scope of execution providing an adequate legal remedy in many cases where formerly it was necessary
'E.g., Ky. R. S. 427.010 et seq. (1948).
-Ayer v. Murray, 15 Otto 126 (U.S. 1881).
iAlexander
v. McPeck, 189 Mass. 84, 75 N.E. 88 (1905). In Kentucky contingent interests in land can be taken and sold under execution. Ky. R. S. 426.190
(1948).
Robinson v. Tischler, 69 Fla. 77, 67 So. 565 (1915).
'St. Lous Hoop & Stave Co. v. Danforth, 160 Mich. 226, 125 N.W 5 (1910).
(Trust resulting to the debtor from payment by hun of the purchase price of
property, and procuring the title to be taken in the name of another); Kirby v.
Bruns, 45 Mo. 284, 100 Am. Dec. 876 (1870) (Improvements placed by a debtor
husband on his wife s land); Hegler et al. v. Grove, 63 Ohio State 404, 59 N.E.
162 (1900) (Equity of redemption).
'Martin v. Carter, 90 Ala. 96, 7 So. 510 (1890).
'Baines
v. Babcock, 95 Cal. 581, 27 Pac. 674 (1891).
8
Vanderpool v. Notley, 71 Mich. 422, 89 N.W 574 (1888). For cases holdig that a creditor may disregard a fraudulent conveyance and have the property
d at an execution sale see Brasie v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., 87 Minn. 456,
92 N.W 840 (1902), and Runyon v. Bevins, 218 Ky. 589, 291 S.W 1033 (1927).
'Bay State Iron Co. v. Goodall, 89 N. H. 223, 75 Am. Dec. 219 (1859).
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to resort to the equitable remedy.10 But these statutes have by no means displaced
the creditors bill, and it still has an important role. Since the creditors bill was
developed by equity to aid the creditor in collecting his debt when the legal
remedies were ineffectual it would seem that the creditors bill would be available
only when the legal remedies have been exhausted, and it is the general rule that
the creditor must obtain a valid judgment and take certain steps toward enforcing
it before he can bring a creditors bill in equity. However, there are exceptions
to the general rule requiring a judgment.1 When none of these exceptions apply
to a particular case the further difficulty arises in determimng how far the creditor
must proceed after he has obtained his judgment before equity will aid him.
It is the purpose of this article to determine when, under Kentucky law, a
creditor has exhausted his legal remedies to the extent necessary to obtain the aid
of equity- when he comes within an exception enabling hun to obtain relief in
equity without first resorting to his legal remedy- and with regard to fraudulent
conveyance actions to note and discuss certain peculiarities in regard to the exception to the general rule requiring a judgment.
When a creditor does not come within any exception to the general rule there
is little difficulty in determining how far he must proceed after he has obtained a
judgment before he can bring a creditors suit in equity. The Kentucky Code of
Civil Practice12 requires that a personal judgment has been recovered against the
debtor, that execution has been issued on the judgment, that the execution has
been placed in the hands of the proper officer, and that it has been returned by
the officer endorsed "no property found." 3 New York and some other jurisdictions
agree that execution returned unsatisfied- is a prerequisite to the suit.1 ' Another
view on this subject, expressed by the United States Supreme Court, is that while
it must be shown that execution has been issued, it is not necessarv to show a return of execution unsatisfied' 1 It is submitted that this is the better view. The
creditor after he has established the validity of Ins claim by a judgment should
not be required to search among a defaulting debtor s assets, or to realize first on
any particular piece of property." What is more important to the debtor from a
practical point of view is that the delay caused by waiting for a return of nulla
bona may endanger the chances of subjecting the debtor s execution-proof assets
to the satisfaction of the creditors judgment, in that the debtor may dispose of
such assets in such a manner as to prevent the creditor from ever reaching them.
This unjust result would be avoided by allowing the creditor to file a creditors
bill immediately after judgment, since the petition, if it describes the property
-Ky. R. S. 426.190 (1948); CONN. GEN. STAT. Sec. 5807 (1930).
"American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Pere Marquette R. R. Co., 205 Fed.
14 (1913) (judgment waived by admission of debt and insolvency); Shuck v.
Quackenbush, 75 Colo. 592, 227 Pac. 1041 (1924) (debtor fled from the state
leaving no property); Overmire v. Haworth, 48 Minn. 372, 51 N.W 121 (1892)
(debtor a non-resident with no property in the state); National Tradesman s
Bank v. Wetmore, 124 N. Y. 241, 26 N.E. 548 (1891) (judgment at law impossible); 38 A.L.R. 269.
'Ky. CoDEs, Civ. PRAc. Sec. 439 (1948).
uWhile it is absolutely necessary that the execution be returned unsatisfied
as a prerequisite to the suit, it is immaterial that the debtor actually had ample
property subject to levy to satisfy the debt so long as the execution has been
returned unsatisfied. Sipple v. Catron, 205 Ky. 81. 265 S.W 491 (1924).
" N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT see. 1189 (1939).
"See Freedman s Savings Bank v. Earle, 110 U. S. 710 (1884).
" GLENN, FA-Dutrnr CoNvEYAcEs see. 28 (Rev. ed. 1940).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

105

to be subjected, will operate as a lis pendens as to purchasers and other creditors
of the debtor. Also, the petition will create a lien on the specified propertyY
A real exception to the rule requiring a personal judgment and execution returned unsatisfied as conditions precedent to suit lies in that form of creditors bill
which seeks to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property. These prerequisites to the suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property have
8
been expressly eliminated in this state by statute." Prior to the enactment of this
statute in order to maintain a suit to set aside a conveyance of real property made
in fraud of creditors, it was necessary for the creditor first to obtain a lien on the
property either by attachment or by an execution against the debtor returned
unsatisfied." In Locheim & Co. v. Eversole.' which was decided shortly after the
enactment of the statute, a creditor sueld to set aside a conveyance of land by his
debtor to her children alleged to have been without consideration and with the
intent to defraud her creditors. The defendant filed a special demurrer objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court until after a return of nulla bona. The Court of
Appeals held that so much of section 439 of the Civil Code as required a return
of execution nulla bona before a creditor could institute an equitable action to set
aside a fradulent conveyance of real property was expressly repealed by this statute. In Smith v. Curd," the Court went further and held that the creditor could
set aside a fradulent deed to land, without first reducing his claim against the
debtor to a personal judgment. It has been held that the creditors refusal to
have execution levied on the debtor s other assets of which he has knowledge is no
bar to a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of land.- Thus, all that is nec
essary for a creditor to do in order to bring a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property is to file a petition in equity alleging a cause of action against
the debtor and facts showing that a fraudulent conveyance has been made. It is
not necessary to exhaust or resort to the legal remedy.'
It seems that the trend generally is to allow a suit to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance of either real or personal property without a personal judgment against
the debtor. This is the universal interpretation of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act." The reason which has been advanced for statutes and judicial
interpretations permitting a creditor to set aside a fraudulent conveyance without
"'Clay City National Bank. v. Bush, 280 Ky. 406, 133 S.W 2d 522 (1939);
Robertson v. Stewart & Spring, 41 Ky. 321 (1842).
Ky. R. S. 378.030 (1948). "Any person aggrieved by the fraudulent conveyance, transfer or mortgage of real property may file a petition in equity against
the parties thereto or their representatives or heirs, alleging the facts showing his
right of action, alleging the fraud or facts constituting it and describing the property. When this petition is filed a lis pendens shall be created upon the property
described, and the suit shall progress and be determined as other suits in equity
and as though it had been brought on a return of nulla bona."
"Meyer v. Ruff, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 254, 16 S.W 84 (1891); Kyle v. O'Neil, 88
Ky. 127, 10 S.W 275 (1889).
"'24 Ky. L. REP. 1031, 70 S.W 661 (1902).
-'24 Ky. L. REP. 1960, 72 S.W 744 (1903).
Yankey v. Sweeney, 85 Ky. 55, 2 S.W 559 (1887).
Campbell v. First National Bank, 234 Ky. 697, 27 S.W 2d 975 (1930).
"Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 18(b), 28 U.S.C.A. following See.
UNrr CoN723c; Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, Sec. 9, GLENN, Fi
vEYANcEs See. 73 (Rev. ed. 1940); Dubia v. Ebeling, 30 Fed. Supp. 992 (1939);
Lind v. 0. N. Johnson, 204 Minn. 30, 282 N.W 661 (1938); American Surety
Co. v. Connor, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783 (1929); Thomas v. Stewart, 178 Okla.
308, 62 Pac. 2d 966 (1936).
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a judgment is that otherwise there is danger that the fraudulently conveyed property may be disposed of in such a manner as will defeat the creditor s right to
reach it.' This view seems to have a sound foundation in both justice and practicality. Certainly there is injustice in a rule of law which requires a creditor to
come armed with a judgment before he can attack a fraudulent conveyance of the
debtor s property, when the delay incident to reducing his claim to a judgment
might jeopardize his opportunity to reach such property. Furthermore, if there
has actually been a fraudulent transaction neither of the fraudulent parties is entitled to any consideration or protection.
It is submitted, however, that the argument for dispensing with judgment
lacks force in Kentucky because in this state other remedies are provided which
prevent collection of a creditor s claim from being endangered pending judgment.
The framers of the present Code of Civil Practice of Kentucky, seeing the necessity for giving the creditor a remedy to protect his interest in the property of ims
debtor fraudulently conveyed, or about to be fraudulently conveyed, provided a
remedy by attachment which can be obtained at the beginning of the action
against the very property fraudulently conveyed. Prior to the enactment of the
statute permitting a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance without a judgment,
it was held that this remedy by attachment was as ample and complete as a
petition in equity to set aside the conveyance," because the levy of attachment
creates a lien on the property fraudulently conveyed' which gives the court junsdiction of the property Then when the creditor gets his judgment against the
debtor and sustains his allegations of fraud the court will subject the property to
the payment of the judgment by virtue of the attachment lien.n Thus, it clearly
appears that the creditor s rights in the property are not endangered pending suit.
Although to perfect an attachment lien on real property against a bona fide
purchaser a lis pendens must be filed in the county court clerk s office pursuant
to statute, this filing is a simple act requiring no more than a few minutes. Since
in this state the creditor can protect himself by attachment proceedings, requirement of a prior judgment is not too burdensome.
Moreover, others besides the debtor and creditor are affected by actions mevolving fraudulent conveyances. Is it equitable to permit a creditor who has not
even established a valid claim against his alleged debtor to file a petition asking
that a conveyance to a third party purchaser be set aside as fraudulent and thus
subject the purchaser to the expense and trouble of defending the suit without
even a bond to indemnify the purchaser in the event the charge is wf6ngfully
made? It would seem that it is not, in view of the fact, as already pointed out,
that"the creditor will not be injured by not being allowed to bring such a suit.
The fact that the Kentucky Court of Appeals refuses to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance of personal property before a judgment may be an.indication that it
feels there is no need for such a suit. In Shepherd et al. v. Haymond a creditor
brought suit to have an assignment of certain notes made by his debtor declared
For example, if the grantee conveys to a bona fide purchaser the creditor
cannot then reach the property. Greene v. Robbins, 29 N. D. 131, 150 N.W 561
(1914).
'Ky. CoDiES, Civ. PSAc. see. 194(7) (1948).
'Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600 (1863).
'Ky. CoDEs, Civ. PRAC. see. 212 (1948).
Kyle v. O'Neil, 88 Ky. 127, 10 S.W 275 (1889).
Ky. R. S. 382.440, 382.450.
"291 Ky. 780, 165 S.W 2d 812 (1942).
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null and void because made in fraud of creditors. The plaintiff had no attachment
lien on the notes and had not recovered a personal judgment against the debtor.
On appeal the Court held that the rule authorizing a creditor to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property without a personal judgment against the debtor
had no application to a fraudulent conveyance of personal property, and that before
such a conveyance could be set aside it was necessary for the creditor to obtain
a lien either by an attachment or by levy of execution with a return of "no property found." It seems that the Kentucky Court is inclined to narrowly restrict
the use of the statute dispensing with previous judgment. In cases of this nature
the Court could easily have extended the statute to include fraudulent conveyances
of personal property as it has held other sections of the fraudulent conveyance
statute equally applicable to both real and personal property.' As to the Court's
view on the need for the suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance before judgment,
significance might be attached to the fact that prior to the statute the Court in
such suits frequently went to elaborate pains to point out that the creditor had
After the statute, in suits to
an adequate remedy by attachment proceedings.'
set aside fraudulent conveyances of real property without a judgment the Court
merely remarks that since the enactment of the statute it is no longer necessary
for the creditor to have a judgment in order to bring the suit,'I without attempting
to justify, or show that it approves of such a proceeding.
The prerequisites to a creditors suit in Kentucky can be briefly summarized.
If the suit is for discovery of the debtors assets, or to reach his intangible property, or any purpose other than to set aside a fraudulent conveyance the creditor
must have a personal judgment against the debtor on which execution has been
issued and returned unsatisfied. If the suit is to set aside a fraudulent conveyance
of personal property the creditor must have obtained a lien either by attachment
or by a return of execution unsatisfied. If the suit is to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance of real property there are no conditions precedent. The creditor
simply files a petition alleging his cause of action against the debtor, and a fraudulent transaction.
Considering the problem from a practical standpoint, it is submitted that the
only prerequisite to any creditors suit should be a valid personal judgment against
the debtor. This rule would allow the creditor to reach his debtor s non-exempt,
execution-proof assets without giving the debtor an opportunity to dispose of them
pending a return of nulla bona, and at the same time prevent spurious suits by
persons asserting some fictious claim against an alleged debtor. The same rule
shiould apply to a suit to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance in this state,
as the creditor can protect his rights in property fraudulently conveyed by attachment proceedings pending suit to obtain a judgment against the debtor. This view
would also protect the grantee of an alleged fraudulent transaction in situations
where in fact the grantee is an innocent bona fide purchaser.
A LoE W
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'Patton v. Walkers Trustees, 118 S.W 312 (Ky. 1909).
*Kyle v. O'Neil, 88 Ky. 127, 10 S.W 275 (1889); Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky.
600 (1883).
' Williams v. Danvenport, 181 Ky. 496, 205 S.W 551 (1918); Smith v. Curd,
24 Ky. L. Rep. 1960, 72 S.W 744 (1903); Lochemi & Co. v. Eversole, 24 Ky. L.
Rep. 1031, 70 S.W 661 (1902); O'Kane v. Vinnedge & Co., 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1551,
55 S.W 711 (1900). But see Crooke v. Humes Ex'tx, 139 Ky. 834, 109 S.W
364 (1908).

